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The following excerpt from the Law School Record of
the University of Chicago (Vol. 3, No. 3, 1954) is part
of a lecture which Professor Katz delivered at a meeting of the Guild Scholars in the Episcopal Church. It is
printed here as some evidence of the revived interest in
the natural law which is to be found among nonCatholic as well as Catholic scholars.

NATURAL LAW -AND
HUMAN NATURE
WILBUR G. KATZ, A.B., LL.B., S.J.D.*

W

HAT IS IT THAT a teacher of corporation law can bring to a
discussion of natural law? Perhaps it is principally his concern
with the problem of the criticism of rules of law. I am awed, of course,
by the mass of learning which has accumulated around varying concepts
of natural law - learning which I have not even systematically sampled.
But twenty years of teaching law have so heightened my concern over
lawless debates about justice and law as to remove many inhibitions.
Without apology, therefore, I may discuss the utility of a concept of
natural law as a basis for the criticism of rules and institutions of
positive law. But first let me summarize the change which these twenty
years have brought about in the law schools in attitudes toward natural
law.
I received my professional training in the twenties when natural law
was all but eclipsed, except in the Roman Catholic law schools. The
dominant legal philosophy was a positivism in which law was merely the
word for what the officers of the State would enforce. Criticism of legal
rules, except in terms of their internal consistency, was viewed as merely
the assertion of the critic's personal opinion. I remember the classmate
who insisted on an ethical point in our class in property law. In a withering tone, the instructor advised him to transfer to the divinity school
if he was interested in such questions. And when Morris Cohen wrote
in defense of natural law philosophy, he said that he expected his effort
to have the kind of reception which would be accorded to a defense of
belief in witchcraft.
It should not be overlooked that part of the hostility to the concept
of natural law was due to its abuse, particularly in the history of the
federal due process clause. Mr. Justice Brewer had said in an address
that the demands of natural law "prevent that any private property . . .
should be subordinated

. . .

in the interests of public health, morals, or

welfare without compensation." And it was on similar grounds that
legislation such as workmen's compensation was first held unconstitutional.
*James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

By the middle forties the general attitude
toward natural law had strikingly changed.
Perhaps the turning point was the perversion
of the legal order in Nazi Germany. Legal
relativism suddenly became ludicrous. Faced
with the Aryan laws, one could hardly comment that the National Socialists merely had
a different view of justice from ours. Books
and articles were published giving new and
respectful attention to the natural law tradition. To be sure, one of these was ridiculed
by a reviewer as "firing feather barrages"
and as "reconciling science and God and
calling it law." But the reviewer himself later
published his own "brief statement of democratic morals" in terms most of which a
natural law philosopher could easily accept.
My own introduction to natural law was
largely at the hands of my then colleague
Mortimer Adler. In this introduction I confess I was not deeply impressed with the
utility of the classic formulations of natural
law principles. But I owe to Mr. Adler the
clue which has led me to the position taken in
this paper. Mr. Adler gave a course called
Law and the Nature of Man, an introduction
to philosophical psychology. Participation in
this course convinced me that inquiry into
the nature of man is the most promising
source of useful natural law criteria. Nor was
this conviction shaken when a student librettist lampooned the course with the parody:
"Law and the Nature of Man, tra la, has
nothing to do with the law."
Let me first use the criminal law to illustrate how analysis of legal problems brings
one to basic questions as to the nature of
man. In my generation it has been fashionable to take the position that criminal responsibility is imposed either to deter (or
prevent) further crime or to reform the
offender. Emphasis on one or the other of
these purposes usually reflects a distinct view
of human nature. To speak of reformation
presupposes a nature capable of moral development. To speak of deterrence presupposes
only a nature capable of conditioning. When
advocates of deterrence are faced with evidence that the deterrent effect of punishment

on the criminal is very doubtful, they usually shift to the point that others, potential
criminals, are more effectively deterred. This
is highly probable, but it raises the question
of the justice of punishing one man for the
purpose of conditioning others. This point
would not be serious if it were recognized
that punishment is justified as retribution,
but retributory theories have generally been
rejected in recent decades. They have been
dismissed as mere rationalizations of vengeance and as utterly unacceptable in view
of evidence as to the extent to which crime
is traceable to social and family conditions.
This confusion as to the basis of criminal
responsibility is not merely of academic
concern. It has led to confusion and vacillation as to the severity and type of penalties
imposed and as to the handling of borderline
cases of mental incompetence. And it mirrors
an unhealthy confusion in the public attitudes toward crime and punishment.
A natural law approach to criminal law
would require the facing of questions such as
these: Are criminal tendencies unique to a
criminal class or are they similar to tendencies common to all men? Have men a freedom of choice and a moral responsibility
resting upon such freedom or on some other
basis? Are men capable of moral development and under what general conditions does
moral development take place? Is it important in this connection that men are treated
as responsible for their acts?
Here let me sketch very briefly the doctrine of man in which Christians find answers
to such questions. With this view of the
nature of man, I will comment further on
the criminal law and then consider some
aspects of the law of economic organization.
A thumbnail sketch of the nature of man in
the Judeo-Christian tradition must include:
first, man's capacity for creative life in society; secondly, his tendency toward defensive retreat from the frustrations of his
limited creativity; and thirdly, his freedom
and responsibility with respect to these tendencies. Inferences may then be drawn as to
man's proper good and as to conditions

necessary for his development toward this
goal, conditions which legal institutions may
help to establish and maintain.
We begin thus with the capacities in virtue of which man is said to be created in
God's image. I shall only suggest some of
the items in the complex: man's power of
transcendence, his capacity for objective understanding and appreciation, his critical
intelligence, his creative imagination. These
powers are developed and exercised in a
process of social interaction and in the context of man's need for others and his capacity
for creative interpersonal relations.
But these human capacities are finite and
their limits involve disappointment and frustration. Men do not readily accept their limitations in trustful dependence on the providence of God. They attempt in varying ways
to escape these limitations and the pain incident to them, either in aggressive and pretentious rebellion against the limitations or in
weak and slothful withdrawal from the
exercise of their powers. At the conscious
level and in relation to God these tendencies
are called sin, but they are recognized more
or less clearly under other categories in
secular philosophies and in clinical science.
And these reactions become habitual and to
a large extent unconscious. As in the case of
man's creativity, the context for these tendencies is social and man's defensiveness
typically appears in patterns of domination
and submission.
Has man freedom and responsibility in
relation to these tendencies? The answer of
moral theology is yes, but what more can be
said? Here one approaches the limit of human understanding. How am I to avoid the
alternate temptations to prideful assertion
of some pseudo-explanation or to slothful
avoidance of a necessary point in my paper?
Does it help to note that men do three
things in relation to evil (i.e., defensiveness)
in the world?
1. What they do predominantly is to transmit it. Equipped with defensive habits largely
caused by the self-protectiveness of parents
and others who influenced their development,

they meet defensiveness (whether of the aggressive or submissive type) with counter
defense (again either aggressive or submissive). This is the predominant pattern of human action, and in considering what legal
institutions are suitable to man's condition, it
is well not to lose sight of this fact. For this
chain of defensive reactions man's responsibility is primarily communal; it rests upon
the race as a whole.
2. But man not only transmits evil, he
increases it. His freedom to do so is a mystery. Its exercise involves responsibility in a
different sense. It is individual responsibility,
though the presence of Satan in the Genesis
story warns against prideful insistence on
exclusive guilt.
3. Man need not merely transmit or increase evil; he may decrease it, not, to be
sure, by his own power but through the
redemptive power of God. He is free to be
or not to be the channel of this power and
he is responsible for the exercise of this freedom. The cost of accepting this role is the
pain of enduring without self-protectiveness
his share of the world's evil. And his share
includes primarily his own defensive tendencies. To participate in God's redemptive
work man must accept painful self-knowledge and assume full and painful responsibility for his own acts regardless of how completely they may have been determined by
defensive acts of others.
This view of man's powers suggests that
his proper good is the freeing and exercise
of his capacity for creative and loving response to the world and its inhabitants. And
man's advance to this end ordinarily requires
external conditions, conditions in which individuals are enabled to take the painful
steps which this advance requires. Certainly
a measure of peace and security is required
if individuals are to learn to control their
defensive impulses. The environment also
must have such stability that it does not overtax man's nascent and limited capacity for
creative co-operation. Men require also an
environment which treats them as persons,
persons accorded freedom and held to re-

sponsibility. But finally it must be an environment not devoid of forgiveness.
With this rough summary of man's nature
and temporal goal, we may return briefly to
our consideration of the criminal law. If
there is any validity to our view of the natural law of man's present state, it should
follow that the law must somehow teach the
sober fact of responsibility and that in this
sense criminal penalties must be considered
as retributory. And if the propriety of retribution is thus granted, criminals are not unjustly used if their punishment serves to
promote peace and order primarily by deterring others.
At the same time the criminal law may
aim at reformation which, in the terms I have
used, is a matter of voluntary assumption of
responsibility. Here, as well as in mediating
forgiveness, there are dangers of confusing
justice and mercy, but there is clearly room
for devices such as probation, parole, and
individual and group therapy.
In drawing the line as to mental incompetency, the classical rules in Anglo-American law run in terms of capacity to understand the character of one's act and the

distinction between right and wrong. The
perennial debate is over expanding the
category of irresponsibles to include those
who have acted with this understanding but
pursuant to so-called "irresistible impulse."
One difficulty with this change is that medical
experts often disclaim any ability to discriminate in criminal cases between resistible and
irresistible impulses and insist that all criminals should be treated as sick and all criminal acts considered as irresistibly impelled.
I will not say that the traditional rules
have always reached desirable results, but
a natural law approach indicates that the
capacity to distinguish right from wrong is
not an element which should hastily be
abandoned as a criterion of legal responsibility. To say that law is retributive does not
mean, of course, that legal retribution should
always be imposed where moral responsibility exists. Even the clearly insane may bear
in the sight of God a measure of responsibility
for their condition and their acts, but only
the most primitive law treats them as legally
responsible. Similar legal immunity for those
with certain types of emotional illness may
well be justified without weakening the force
of the moral teaching of the law.***

